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BAD CONSEQUENCES
Lackland H. Bloom, Jr*
LMOST inevitably on the first day of law school, a professor will
ask a student how a court should have decided a particular mat-
ter. The student will respond by proposing a result or rule. The
professor then points out all of the undesirable consequences which
might follow upon adoption of the student's proposal. The professor has
just made a classic "parade of horribles," or bad consequences argument.
It is not surprising that law students meet this argument at the very outset
of their legal education since it is a main stay of legal argumentation, as
well it should be. When faced with a decision, if one alternative is likely
to lead to bad results, a rational person would presumably hesitate before
choosing that course of action. Thus, the bad consequences argument
tends to have logical and intuitive appeal. Moreover, it is an easy argu-
ment to make. Decisions, especially legal decisions, generally do have
consequences, and it will usually be difficult to determine exactly what
they will be with any certainty. The future, by definition, is uncertain.
And yet, it only takes a modicum of imagination to speculate about what
very well might happen. The argument of bad consequences can be a
powerful tool in the hands of the advocate because it tends to place the
opponent in the uncomfortable position of attempting to refute the spec-
ulative state of affairs that presently exists only in the advocate's
imagination.
Given the appeal of this argument, it is hardly surprising that it has
been employed with great frequency by the Supreme Court of the United
States from the earliest days and continues to play a significant role in
contemporary constitutional interpretation. It has been utilized by the
Court in many of its most memorable decisions including: Marbury v.
Madison,1 McCulloch v. Maryland,2 Lochner v. New York,3 Youngstown
Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,4 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 Mapp v.
*Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law,'Southern Methodist University. This
article is a chapter from a forthcoming book tentatively entitled Constitutional Explanation
analyzing the interpretive and explanatory devices which the Supreme Court has employed
in its constitutional law opinions.
1. 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803).
2. 17 U.S. 316, 426 (1819).
3. 198 U.S. 45, 59-64 (1906).
4. 343 U.S. 579, 635, 636, 651-53 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
5. 376 U.S. 254, 267, 279, 292 (1964).
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Ohio,6 Griswold v. Connecticut,7 Miranda v. Arizona,8 United States v.
Nixon,9 Bakke v. Regents of the University of California,'0 just to mention
a few. Although bad consequences is an easy argument to make and a
frequent argument made, it is not always a convincing argument. Nor is it
necessarily a bad argument. To a large extent, it depends on the advo-
cate's ability to persuade the reader that bad things are, in fact, likely to
occur if a particular course of action is followed. There are a number of
obvious responses, including: there is no reason to believe that these bad
consequences will actually happen, the bad consequences might occur but
can be prevented, the consequences are really not that bad after all, or if
the bad consequences occur, we simply must suffer them in order to
achieve other important ends. Each of these responses can be found in
the case law. It should also be noted that there are two somewhat differ-
ent types of bad consequences-those over which the courts will have
some control and those over which they won't. Often the argument is
made that a particular rule or result is undesirable because it will prove
unworkable, confusing, or easily abused. Presumably, these consequences
may be avoided or tempered somewhat through further judicial supervi-
sion. On the other hand, when the bad consequences will result from the
independent conduct of third parties in response to the judicial ruling, the
courts may have less ability to contain the damage.
This article will examine several aspects of the bad consequences argu-
ment. First, it will briefly consider instances in which the bad conse-
quences argument is employed as a means of bolstering some other form
of constitutional argument. Next, it will examine the use of the bad conse-
quences argument as a rhetorical device. Then it will consider the issue of
whether there needs to be some showing that bad consequences will actu-
ally occur. Next, it will discuss cases in which the bad consequences in
question are legal rules or doctrines which the Court itself has some abil-
ity to avoid. Finally, it will discuss constitutional boundary disputes in
which the bad consequences argument has become something of a struc-
tural principle.
BAD CONSEQUENCES AND OTHER INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGIES
The bad consequences argument is often used as a method of bolster-
ing some other type of accepted constitutional argument. For instance in
McCulloch v. Maryland," Chief Justice Marshall employed bad conse-
quences to aid his textual argument of defining the word "necessary"
broadly in the Necessary and Proper Clause to mean "appropriate,"
rather than narrowly to mean "essential," by contending that the nar-
6. 367 U.S. 643, 654, 660 (1961).
7. 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
8. 384 U.S. 486, 483 (1966), id. at 516 (Harlan,, J., dissenting), id. at 542 (White, J.
dissenting).
9. 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
10. 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978).
11. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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rower reading would lead to the undesirable result of precluding Con-
gress from addressing unforeseen exigencies,' 2 although it is not
altogether clear why such consequences would follow. Bad consequences
are often raised in support of doctrinal arguments. For instance, in Zo-
rach v. Clausen, Justice Douglas made a classic bad consequences argu-
ment in support of the doctrinal position that separation of church and
state can't possibly mean complete separation since
Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire pro-
tection to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into
their places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our
legislative halls, the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the
Chief Executive; the proclamation making Thanksgiving Day a holi-
day; "so help me God" in our courtroom oaths-these and all other
references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public
rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. 13
Another standard use to which the bad consequences argument can be
put is to emphasize that it is important not to be blinded by the seemingly
insignificant impact of the facts before the Court, but to remain aware
that the principle will apply to harms of a greater magnitude as well. For
instance, in Crandall v. Nevada,'4 the Court invalidated a tax of one dol-
lar on every person leaving the state by vehicle for hire. In the process, it
pointed out, however, that the potential harm was hardly limited to one
dollar per head since "if the state can tax a railroad passenger one dollar,
it can tax him one thousand dollars... [i]f one state can do this, so can
every other state."'15
BAD CONSEQUENCES AS RHETORICAL ARGUMENT
Occasionally, the bad consequences argument is presented almost as a
matter of rhetorical overkill. If the Court reaches a particular result, all
hell will break loose. The famous nineteenth-century political question
doctrine case of Luther v. Borden16 presents a well-known example of an
assertion of "really" bad consequences. The issue there was whether the
Court should determine which of two competing groups was, in fact, the
legitimate government of Rhode Island. As Chief Justice Taney put it: if
the existing charter government should be deemed to have been
illegitimate
12. Id. at 415.
13. 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952). Strangely enough, Justice Douglas seemed to believe
he was supporting a textual argument having proclaimed that the First Amendment "stu-
diously defines the manner, the specific ways in which there shall be no concert or union or
dependency" between the church and the state. Id. at 312. Of course the First Amendment
itself does no such thing. The law of freedom of religion would presumably be considerably
clearer and less complicated if it did. Justice Douglas must have meant that the Court's
First Amendment doctrine does this.
14. 73 U.S. 35, (1867).
15. Id. at 46.
16. 48 U.S 1 (1849).
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then the laws passed by its legislatures during that time were nulli-
ties; its taxes wrongfully collected; its salaries and compensation to
its officers illegally paid; its public accounts improperly settled; and
the judgements and sentences of its courts in civil and criminal cases
null and void, and the officers who carried their decisions into opera-
tion answerable as trespassers, if not in some cases as criminals. 17
This is essentially a prudential or institutional argument. The Court is
saying that, even if it could decide between these two governments, it
shouldn't because that would lead to very dire consequences. In the con-
text of the entire case, the argument may well be something of a make-
weight since there were other considerations prompting the Court's
decision which it seemed to consider more significant. The bad conse-
quences argument in Luther certainly gets the reader's attention, but it
readily appears to be little more than rhetorical hyperbole.
Obviously, one could ask why an invalidation of the existing govern-
ment, whether by the Court, the President, or Congress must inevitably
throw Rhode Island into a retroactive state of anarchy. That would seem
to be a state of affairs to be avoided if at all possible. Why couldn't the
Court simply declare that, as of now, the charter government is illegiti-
mate? However, to avoid chaos, its authorized actions up to this time will
be accepted. In other words, the obvious response to catastrophic conse-
quences can be that they simply don't have to happen, even if the Court
takes the course of action in question.
The foundational case of Marbury v. Madison provides another noted
example of rhetorical overstatement of potential adverse consequences.
In justifying judicial review of Congressional legislation, Chief Justice
Marshall relied heavily on the fact that we have a written constitution
intended to define and limit governmental power.18 Near the end of his
opinion, he argued that the absence of judicial review "would subvert
the very foundation of all written constitutions ... [and would] reduce
what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions
to nothing-a written constitution. 19" Marshall had a point, but with his
characteristic vigor, he took it too far. Judicial review does provide a
significant-probably the most significant-method of enforcing constitu-
tional limitations. However, it is by no means the only method, as Mar-
shall would have us believe. Marshall was not challenged on this point
since the decision was unanimous; however, scholars have since observed
that constitutional limitations can indeed be enforced through the politi-
cal process itself, as is done in many countries which have written consti-
tutions but do not have judicial review of actions by coordinate branches
17. Id. at 38-39. The Court made a similar argument in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53
U.S. 299, 321 (1851), when it observed that if the local pilotage law in question violated the
Commerce Clause, then sixty years of illegally collected fees would need to be repaid.
18. 5 U.S. 137, 175 (1803).




The more recent landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut21 provides
yet another example of dire speculation about bad consequences obvi-
ously offered up for rhetorical effect rather than logical persuasion. In the
course of invalidating the criminal conviction of a birth control clinic di-
rector as an aider and abettor for dispensing contraceptives to a married
couple in violation of a law banning the use of such contraceptives, Jus-
tice Douglas conjured up the spectacle of a "police search [of] the sacred
precincts of the marital bedrooms for tell tale signs of the use of contra-
ceptives."'22 In dissent, Justice Stewart pointed out that there had not
been, nor would there likely be, any realistic threat of such a "bedroom
search."' 23 But that, of course, was quite beside the point. Justice Douglas
knew that as well. He was obviously using this rather extreme hypotheti-
cal to attempt to tie his theory back to the marital couple, the primary
subject of the legislation, as well as to finish up with a rhetorical flourish.
There are instances, however, where a justice acknowledges that the
consequences of a decision or rule will not be catastrophic but should
nevertheless be avoided. As Justice Jackson put it in Youngstown Steel &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, permitting the President to seize and operate the
steel mills during war time would not "plunge us straight away into dicta-
torship, but it is a step in the wrong direction. '24 Likewise in Boyd v.
United States, the Court recognized that, though a subpoena for private
papers is "divested of many of the aggravating circumstances of actual
search and seizure.. ., illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their
first footing. . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal
modes of procedure. '25 If anything, the modesty of these observations is
far more persuasive than the more catastrophic predictions which the
Court sometimes makes.
WILL THE BAD CONSEQUENCES ACTUALLY OCCUR?
The bad consequences argument is persuasive only to the extent that
the likelihood of occurrence seems realistic. It is generally easy enough
to argue that any course of action will lead to unfortunate results, but
how do we know that these things will actually come to pass? To what
extent should it be the obligation of the proponent of such an argument
to provide some support for the dire predictions? It is not unusual for the
Court to speculate about the impact of its decision and yet make no effort
whatsoever to provide any empirical grounding for its predictions. In rec-
ognizing a qualified presidential communications privilege in United
States v. Nixon, the unanimous Court opined that
20. See William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.
J. 1, 17.
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. Id. at 485.
23. Id. at 525.
24. 343 U.S. 579, 651 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
25. 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
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allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably
relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of
due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the
courts.... The President's broad interest in confidentiality of com-
munications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of
conversations preliminary shown to have some bearing on the pend-
ing criminal cases.
26
The Court offered no factual basis for this conclusion. Intuitively, one
might believe that the Court had it backwards-that there was likely to
be a sizeable chill on communications and very little law enforcement
need. Nixon was a strange case decided under political and deadline pres-
sure, so perhaps the Court's bald assertions may be understood if not
excused. Still, it provides a sterling example of a tendency of the Court to
offer up the bad consequences argument on faith alone. Since Nixon was
unanimous there was no one to raise these questions in dissent. Usually
there is, however. For instance, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,27 the ma-
jority significantly altered the common law of libel in an attempt to better
accommodate protection of reputation with freedom of speech. The
Court's doctrinal superstructure was challenged from opposite ends of
the spectrum on the ground that it was based on unsupported hunch and
speculation. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell purported to be design-
ing a set of rules that would avoid the bad consequences of either over or
under protecting reputation, but the dissenters had their doubts. Justice
Brennan charged that Justice Powell's argument that public figures could
protect themselves by responding through the media was an "unproved
and highly speculative generalization .... "28 Unlike Justice Brennan,
who believed that Justice Powell's compromises cut too deeply into first
amendment values, Justice White contended that it eviscerated the inter-
est in reputation. Justice White faulted Justice Powell for providing "no
hard facts" to support his thesis that private citizen libel litigation would
result in a chilling effect on the truth.29 It is still a matter of debate as to
who is correct on these questions; however, Justices Brennan and White
were surely right in pointing out that Justice Powell's elaborate doctrinal
superstructure does indeed seem to be based on unsupported guesses as
to how private citizens and the press will behave.
Yet another response to a bad consequences argument is not to merely
ask "where's the evidence" but to attempt to set forth evidence to the
contrary. The famous case of Miranda v. Arizona30 provides an example.
The opponents of the Court's Miranda warnings, including the dissenters,
charged that the rules would impair the ability of the police to obtain
confessions which are necessary to solve crime 3' and would return mur-
26. 418 U.S. 683, 712-13 (1974).
27. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
28. Id. at 361, 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 368, 390 (White, J., dissenting).
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31. Id. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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derers and rapists to the street. 32 These would indeed be bad conse-
quences if they were to occur and very well might result in a reduction in
the public's esteem for the Court. But the Court was not without a de-
fense to this argument. It was able to point out that both the FBI and
English police had delivered similar warnings for quite some time with
little apparent trouble.33 That is not to say that these examples might not
be distinguishable from the state systems to which Miranda would apply;
however, as a practical matter, the burden of persuasion had been thrown
back to the critics.
BAD DOCTRINAL CONSEQUENCES
When the Court is contemplating the prospect that a rule or decision
will lead third parties to engage in conduct which may result in bad conse-
quences, it may have to acknowledge that once it sets the process in mo-
tion, there will be little that it can do to stop the harm from occurring.
However, where there is concern that a decision or legal rule will cause
future courts to issue decisions or build on the rule in a manner that
would be harmful, the Court must consider whether it will be able to
tailor the rule to avoid this harm. Will there be confusion or can stability
be established? Can a sensible line be drawn or will it be arbitrary? Will
there be a slippery slope or will there be footholds?
Many of the bad consequences arguments in the Supreme Court re-
volve around these questions. One common variant of the bad conse-
quences argument attempts to defeat a particular legal approach by
asserting that it will result in a series of incorrect legal decisions in the
future which the courts themselves will be incapable of avoiding. For in-
stance, in Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren
Bridge,34 the Court declined to read a covenant not to issue a competing
charter into the charter previously issued to the owner of a bridge on the
grounds that it would undermine the development of roads and bridges in
an expanding economy, and that the Court would be hard-pressed to alle-
viate the problem since it would require the creation of an arbitrary set of
rules as to what is and isn't permissible. 3
5
Chief Justice Marshall's famous thesis in McCulloch v. Maryland that
the power to tax is the power to destroy, which led him to conclude that a
state may not impose a specific tax on a federal instrumentality, 36 is a
similar argument. To illustrate, Marshall noted that, if permitted, "they
may tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they may tax patent-rights; they
may tax the papers of the custom house; they may tax judicial process;
they may tax all means employed by the government, to an excess which
32. Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting)
33. Id. at 483.
34. 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
35. Id. at 552.
36. 17 U.S. 316, 426 (1819).
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would defeat all ends of government. '37 A classic parade of horribles
indeed! A century later, however, in response to the argument that the
power to tax is the power to destroy, Justice Holmes succinctly re-
sponded "not while this Court sits.''38 In other words, if we make the
mess, we can clean it up. In answer to the argument that recognition of a
particular rule or power might be abused, the Court or individual justices
have often responded as Justice Story did in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee
that " it is always a doubtful course, to argue against the use or existence
of a power, from the possibility of its abuse." 39 The general point is valid,
but Justice Story goes too far. The argument for potential abuse is not
"always" a bad argument. Sometimes it is a good argument. Some powers
are more likely to be abused than others. Some rules are more likely to
prove arbitrary or create confusion or to inevitably lead to undesirable
results than others. The key is to determine when the bad consequences
or abuse argument is sensible and when it is not. To return again to Jus-
tice Holmes "where to draw the line ... [i]s the question in pretty much
everything worth arguing in the law."
'40
However, Plessy v. Ferguson4' should caution us against automatically
assuming that courts will necessarily come to the rescue and protect us
against bad consequences should they materialize. In upholding a Louisi-
ana law requiring separate railroad cars for blacks and whites, the Court
went out of its way to reject the arguments set forth by "learned counsel
for the plaintiff" to the effect that the decision would authorize the state
to "enact laws requiring colored people to walk upon one side of the
street and white people on the other side of the street, or requiring white
men's houses to be painted white and colored men's black ... [since] the
reply to all this is that every exercise of the police power must be reason-
able, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the
promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of
a particular class."'42 Sixty years of hard core segregation constructed on
the edifice of Plessy demonstrates the insight of "learned counsel for the
plaintiffs" and the woeful inadequacy of the Court's reliance on the rea-
sonableness principle, an error which Justice Harlan clearly recognized in
dissent.43
Employment Division v. Smith,44 a highly controversial case in the area
of Free Exercise of Religion, is a contemporary example of judicial fear
of an inability to draw defensible lines. Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia construed the Free Exercise Clause to stand for the principle that
37. Id. at 432.
38. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex. rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
39. 14 U.S. 304, 344 (1816). See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561, 572 (1832)
(McClean, J., dissenting).
40. Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168 (1925).
41. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
42. Id. at 549.
43. Id. at 550, 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
44. 494 U.S. 872 (1989).
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neutral and general laws which simply burdened the exercise of religion
do not violate the Free Exercise Clause.45 In settling on that principle,
Justice Scalia relied on the bad consequences argument raised in Reyn-
olds v. United States,46 the Court's first Free Exercise case. The Court
decided that absent such a rule of neutrality, every person would become
a law unto themselves, resulting in anarchy. 47 Justice Scalia believed that
the Court couldn't alleviate the problem through future line drawing be-
cause it would be inappropriate, if not impossible, for the Court to at-
tempt to determine whether a particular practice was central to a
religious faith.48 Concurring in the result but not the opinion, Justice
O'Connor objected to Justice Scalia's neutrality approach with her own
bad consequences argument: that it was an undesirable rule because it
would unduly restrict the Free Exercise Clause to providing protection
against only the fairly unusual law that specifically targets religious prac-
tices.49 In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that it was improper to adopt
a rule simply because a preferable alternative might be subject to abuse,
an argument which he noted could always be raised.50 Frequently, the
bad consequences argument is window-dressing. Smith, however, is an
important case in which it appears that it played a significant role. Justice
Scalia's fear that alternatives would either create chaos or force the Court
into an institutionally inappropriate position would seem to be the pri-
mary rationale behind his approach. In rejecting Justice O'Connor's and
Justice Blackmun's alternative approaches, Justice Scalia and the majority
essentially decided that our bad consequences are worse than yours.
Washington v. Davis51 would seem to be another case in which the
prospect of bad consequences influenced the decision. There, the Court
concluded that, under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must show
discriminatory intent rather than simply adverse impact in order to estab-
lish an Equal Protection violation based on race. 52 Although the Court
relied on arguments of precedent, doctrine, and principle, looming over
the decision was it's conclusion that an impact standard "would raise seri-
45. Id. at 877-79.
46. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). There the Court opined that if the Free Exercise Clause pro-
tected polygamy, the state would be able to prohibit human sacrifice as part of religious
worship or a wife from throwing herself onto her husband's funeral pyre. Id. at 166. This
is certainly one of the Court's more memorable parades of horribles and yet both of these
examples refer to actual religious practices.
47. Id. at 888.
48. Id. at 887. Justice Scalia believed that Justice Blackmun essentially favored such
an approach through his focus on the impact of the practice. Id. at n.4.
49. Id. at 893.
50. Id. at 916-17. In Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), a recent Establishment
Clause Case, Justices Souter concurring and Scalia dissenting engaged in dueling battle of
bad doctrinal consequences. Justice Souter charged that Justice Scalia's non-preferentialist
approach would require the Court to engage in comparative theology to evaluate prayers,
id. at 616, while Justice Scalia responded that Justice Souter's separationist approach would
outlaw many well-accepted practices such as placing the phrase "In God We Trust" on
coins, id. at 639.
51. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
52. Id. at 240.
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ous questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, wel-
fare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more
burdensome to the poor and to the average black man than to the more
affluent white. Given that rule such consequences would perhaps be
likely to follow. ''53 That was obviously a risk that the Court was unwilling
to take. It was not convinced that it might be avoided by drawing distinc-
tions on a case-by-case basis or through the employment of procedural
devices such as presumptions and the shifting burdens of proof.
Boiling v. Sharpe,54 a companion case to Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,55 is yet another case in which the risk of bad consequences, to some
extent to the Court itself, may have been quite important to the decision.
In Bolling, the Court found for the first time in the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause an equality principle allowing it to invalidate segre-
gation in the District of Columbia schools. The doctrinal obstacles to this
result were formidable; however, the Court candidly admitted that "in
view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from main-
taining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that
the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the federal govern-
ment. '56 The Court essentially admitted that it had no choice but to so
construe Due Process in order to avoid the serious adverse consequences
of being seen as hypocritical by allowing segregation to continue in its
own backyard which would in turn severely undermine voluntary compli-
ance with Brown. This is an instance where, as a prudential matter, the
threat of adverse institutional consequences was so severe that it may
have been a controlling factor.
BAD CONSEQUENCES AS STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLE
Often, the bad consequences argument is a makeweight which doesn't
appear to greatly influence the decision in the case. There is one particu-
lar context in constitutional law in which this argument rises to the level
of structural principle, however, and that is the policing of constitutional
boundaries. This is sometimes between the state and the individual, but
even more frequently in the federalism area between the national govern-
ment and the states. In an area where authority is divided, the argument
is frequently made that if a particular rule is adopted, the boundary will
either be erased or it will at least be moved too far in one direction or the
other. In this context, the bad consequences argument looms large. In the
53. Id. at 248. The Court expressed similar concerns in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 315-17 (1987), where it concluded that a challenge to the imposition of the death
penalty on the grounds that racial discrimination played an improper role must establish
intent to discriminate by the particular jury rather than through statistical evidence of sys-
tem-wide bias. The Court worried that reliance on statistical evidence alone might call into
question a host of other decisions throughout the criminal process where disparities might
exist. Id. Justice Brennan in dissent argued that the death penalty was readily distinguish-
able from other sentences and punishments. Id. at 340 (Brennan, J, dissenting).
54. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
55. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56. Id. at 500.
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substantive due process liberty of contract cases of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, where rights of individual liberty came into
conflict with the state police power, the Court often relied on potential
adverse consequences as a justification for holding the constitutional line
it had drawn. For instance, in Lochner v. New York,57 the majority was
obviously quite troubled by the consequences that might follow if the leg-
islature were permitted to limit the hours that a baker could work. It
opined that:
A printer, a tinsmith, a locksmith, a carpenter, a cabinetmaker, a dry
goods clerk, a bank's, a lawyer's, or a physician's clerk, or a clerk in
almost any kind of business, would all come under the power of the
legislature on this assumption. No trade, no occupation, no mode of
earning one's living, could escape this all-pervading power, and the
acts of the legislature in limiting the hours of labor in all employ-
ments would be valid, although such limitation might seriously crip-
ple the ability of the laborer to support himself and his family.
58
The Lochner Court's attempt to maintain this boundary was ultimately
abandoned and replaced with deference to the state legislatures after
which its worst fears were indeed realized.
Perhaps no area of constitutional law has so consistently given rise to
expressed concern by the Court that a failure to hold firm will result in
complete collapse of a constitutionally significant boundary line as the
federalism cases, especially those cases attempting to discern the limits of
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. In the seminal case of
Gibbons v. Ogden,5 9 Chief Justice Marshall recognized that the very enu-
meration of the power to regulate interstate commerce presumed that
there must be something beyond which Congress could not reach. For
nearly two centuries, the Court has struggled to define that boundary. In
these cases, the fear that the inability to draw the line will result in eras-
ing the boundary entirely has been a constant concern of the Court. As
the battle over the scope of the Commerce Clause came to a head in the
mid-nineteen thirties in cases such as Carter v. Carter Coal Co.60 and
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,61 the Court invalidated
Congressional attempts to regulate wages, prices, and business practices
for fear that, under the government's theories, "federal authority would
embrace practically all the activities of the people, and the authority of
the state over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the
federal government. '62 Shortly thereafter, the Court gave up the fight
57. 198 U.S. 45 (1906).
58. Id. at 59. The Court continued in this vein for the better part of three pages. See
also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 12 (1983) (permitting Congress to reach private
conduct under the enforcement section of section 5 of the 14th amendment would allow
Congress to effectively write a complete municipal code).
59. 22 U.S. 1, 194-95 (1824).
60. 298 U.S. 238 (1934).
61. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
62. Id. at 546. The Court made a similar argument with respect to the Spending Power
in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 75 (1936), where it concluded that permitting the
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and chose to defer to Congress and, as with Lochner, the consequences
which the Court feared came to pass.
Within the past decade the Court has determined once again to play a
role in defining the boundary of Congressional authority under the Com-
merce Clause. In the course of concluding in United States v. Lopez63 that
a federal criminal law prohibiting the carrying of a firearm in or near a
school exceeded the Commerce power, the Court appeared to be heavily
moved by the need for some assurance that there is some real limitation
on the scope of the Commerce Clause. It noted that:
Under the theories that the Government presents ... it is difficult to
perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as crimi-
nal law enforcement or education where states historically have been
sovereign. Thus, if we accept the government's arguments, we are
hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is
without power to regulate. 64
In this context, the prospect of bad consequences has arguably become a
significant structural principle. If the government is unable to offer at
least some limiting principle to its commerce clause theory, then the the-
ory is constitutionally inadequate.
CONCLUSION
The argument of bad consequences is a staple element of legal reason-
ing. It appears with great regularity in the Supreme Court's constitu-
tional jurisprudence. More often than not, it is employed as an adjunct to
some other form of argument. Frequently, it appears to be a minor con-
sideration if not a makeweight. It is easily raised but often easily an-
swered as well. The validity of the argument is often dependent upon
predictions about unknowable future events which sometimes lead to du-
eling parades of horribles with no obvious method of resolution. This is
particularly true when it is asserted that a rule or decision will cause non-
judicial actors to engage in action which will result in bad consequences.
On the other hand, when it is asserted, as it often is, that a rule will result
in adverse consequences because it will be difficult to apply in the future,
at least it is arguable that the Court itself may be able to solve these
problems through careful case-by-case adjudication. Whether that is in
fact true, however, will depend on the circumstances.
Perhaps the most significant recurring instance of the bad conse-
quences rule in constitutional law is in the context of boundary policing,
especially in the area of federalism. There it is often argued that, if a
government to regulate agricultural production through conditional contracts would result
in "a total subversion of the governmental power reserved to the states." Id.
63. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
64. Id. at 564. The Court made similar arguments in the course of invalidating a por-
tion of The Violence Against Women Act which created a civil damage remedy for gender-
based assaults in United States v. Morrison, 120 Sup Ct 1740 (2000). The Court reasoned
that the theory underlying the Act would allow Congress to regulate any violent crime as
well as any area of family law. Id. at 1752-53.
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particular rule is not established, the crucial constitutional boundary be-
tween federal and state spheres of authority will be erased. The influence
of this argument has risen and fallen and risen again in the Court's case
law. There is some intuitive appeal to the argument and it would appear
that to some extent, at least with respect to non-economic commerce
clause legislation, it may have become a significant elemental principle.
That is, if the government is unable to establish to the Court's satisfaction
that there is no logical stopping place to its theory, then the law will be
invalidated.
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